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Unsatisfactory results from privatization have caused local governments to seek 
alternative reforms. Inter-municipal cooperation, mixed public/private delivery and 
contract reversals are three alternatives that have gained traction in the last decade. 
These alternatives help local governments manage markets for public service delivery 
as a dynamic process. They maximize government/market complementarities and 
address a wider array of public goals beyond cost efficiency concerns. The alternative 
reforms show how local governments balance citizen, labor and community interests to 
ensure efficiency, coordination and stability in public service delivery. 
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The special issue published in 2007 (volume 33, issue 4) of this journal contained a set 
of articles which showed the debate on local government reform needed to move from a 
simple debate on privatization to a broader discussion of alternative reforms. Reforms 
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beyond privatization were increasingly experienced worldwide, as shown by the 
expansion of municipal corporations in Portugal (Tavares and Camoes, 2007), dynamic 
market management in different countries (Bel and Fageda 2007, Dijkgraaf and Gardus, 
2007), relational contracting (Brown, Potoski and van Slyke, 2007), and reverse 
privatization in the US (Hefetz and Warner, 2007). In the decade that has elapsed since 
2007, alternative reforms to privatization have expanded, in practice as well as in 
scholarly analysis. 
 
Intermunicipal cooperation, mixed public/private delivery and reverse privatization 
have become much more common production choices over the last decades. Together 
they illustrate the importance of market management to secure benefits from alternative 
forms of service delivery. In this updated overview we present the latest empirical 
analyses of these reforms, exploring factors driving them and their outcomes, especially 
the evidence on costs. We find cost is but one concern local governments face. We 
highlight the critical role local governments play in managing markets, public values 
and community interests, especially labor.  
 
Intermunicipal Cooperation  
While privatization was based on the benefits of competition, inter-municipal 
cooperation reflects the importance of strategic collaboration as local governments form 
networks to achieve economies of scale and reduce negative externalities (McGuire and 
Agranoff, 2011; Bel and Warner, 2016). Intermunicipal cooperation in service 
production encompasses a variety of forms. To delimit different types of cooperative 
arrangements, Feiock and Scholz (2010) emphasize autonomy, viewed as the ease of 
entry and exit from a collaborative agreement. In Europe these types of agreements can 
take the form of joint corporations, in which municipalities share ownership and 
production. The collaborative may jointly produce one or several services, contract to 
one of the members, or contract to an external party – either for profit or non-profit. 
While intermunicipal contracting is more limited in Europe, in the US it is more 
common than privatization (Kim and Warner, 2016; Hefetz et al., 2012).  
 
Cooperation has expanded in the last decade. Bel and Warner (2016) conduct a 
metaregression analysis on the existing multivariate empirical studies on factors 
explaining cooperation. While only 15 studies had been published on that topic before 
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2007, in the last decade (between 2007 and 2016) 34 studies were conducted (almost all 
of them published). While all 15 studies prior to 2007 were conducted for the US (but 
one for Mexico), the literature in the last decade has included analysis for Argentina, 
Brazil France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Portugal and Spain. While practically all pre-
existing studies on factors explaining cooperation followed the methodology used to 
study factors explaining privatization (see Bel and Fageda, 2007, 2017), more recent 
research is developing unique methodological and empirical approaches to address 
cooperation in its own right. These include differences in factors driving cooperation 
(Kim, 2018; Bel and Warner, 2016), and use of alternative modeling approaches such as 
a hazard model in Germany (Bergholz, 2018) or multilevel modeling to study duration 
of agreements in the US (Aldag and Warner 2018).  
 
European studies treat cooperation as a service delivery alternative to privatization, but 
driven by similar objectives, primarily cost reduction. US studies give attention to a 
much broader array of motivating factors, beyond cost reduction, related to spatial 
location and organizational factors. Countries with fragmented local government face 
the challenge of regional coordination to address spillovers and externalities of service 
delivery, and intermunicipal cooperation is one response. 
 
Empirical studies of inter-municipal cooperation find it is an important alternative to 
for-profit contracting (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke, 2008; Hefetz, Vigoda-Gadot and 
Warner 2012). While competition and efficiency are the primary factors driving 
privatization, inter-municipal contracting is based on cooperation and is focused on 
longer term community concerns (Kim, 2018). Intermunicipal cooperation also is used 
as a market management strategy to enhance competition in uncompetitive markets 
(Girth et al., 2012; Hefetz and Warner, 2012), to achieve economies of scale while 
maintaining public control (Hefetz, Vigoda- Gadot and Warner, 2014b), to enhance 
market power of local governments in private contracting (Bel, Fageda and Mur, 2013), 
and to preserve service delivery in the face of fiscal stress, especially after the Great 
Recession (Kim and Warner 2016).  
 
Scholarly analysis of the economic effects has expanded, particularly for European 
countries. In Bel and Warner’s (2015) review, a total of eight empirical studies on 
cooperation and costs were found in the literature. Only one of them (Bel and Costas, 
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2006) for Catalonia-Spain had been published before we wrote Bel, Hebdon and Warner 
(2007). The other seven were conducted for Norway, Netherlands, Italy and other 
regions of Spain.  
 
Most work in the US is based on case studies and finds cooperation results in cost 
savings less than half the time (Holzer and Fry 2011). A quantitative analysis of the 
economic effect of cooperation conducted for New York State by Bel, Qian and Warner 
(2017) found similar results. Six additional studies on cooperation and costs have been 
identified for Germany, Czech Republic and, again, for the Netherlands, Norway and 
Spain. In short, in only one decade, fourteen more multivariate empirical studies on the 
effects of cooperation on costs have been conducted.  
 
Empirical studies typically find that cooperation reduces costs, particularly when 
services with scale economies and small municipalities are involved. However, 
transaction costs can be higher than potential savings for services where scale 
economies are small, and municipalities were already operating close to their optimal 
production dimension. When cooperation is not primarily driven by cost savings, as in 
the US, then cost savings are less likely to be found. 
 
Mixed delivery 
Mixed delivery occurs when a government provides a service through both public and 
contracted delivery. This may involve dividing the jurisdiction into several districts or 
dividing the service into several parts and using public delivery in some and contracted 
delivery in others (Warner and Bel, 2008; Warner and Hefetz 2008). According to 
Miranda and Lerner (1995), this ‘redundancy’ in delivery methods can be efficient 
because it makes benchmarking possible with the private sector, and also promotes 
bureaucratic competition in house. Thus, mixed delivery can promote competition by 
introducing pressures on public firms and by preventing monopolization by private firms 
(Miranda and Lerner, 1995; Girth et al., 2012; Bel, Brown and Warner, 2014).  
 
Mixed delivery is very common in the US and grew along with private contracting as a 
means to manage contracts (Warner and Hefetz, 2008). In contrast, mixed delivery is less 
frequent in Europe (Warner and Bel, 2008) where mixed public/private firms are more 
common. In this type of organizational form, the government and its private partners share 
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ownership of the firm (Warner and Bel, 2008; Cruz et al., 2014). The model is also 
referred to as ‘partial privatization’ (Bel and Fageda, 2010).  
 
The rise in mixed delivery seeks to achieve the benefits of both market and public delivery 
(Warner and Hefetz, 2008): private firms are interested in efficiency and profits; while 
also being interested in efficiency, the public sector is expected to provide failsafe 
delivery and public accountability and involvement. There are few empirical studies on 
the effects of mixed delivery on service costs. Miranda and Lerner (1995) was the first 
study to address this issue. They found US cities with a higher percentage of services 
provided by mixed delivery incurred lower expenditures than those with a higher 
percentage of direct production. Recently, Bel and Rosell (2016) studied the effects of 
mixed delivery and costs in a single service (metropolitan bus) within one jurisdiction 
(Barcelona). They found private delivery is more costly than public delivery within this 
mixed delivery system, and that competition for contracts helps reduce costs. 
 
Recent studies of mixed delivery have moved beyond a singular focus on costs and 
instead focus more broadly on the challenges of market management. Reform is no longer 
considered to be a simple choice to ‘make or buy,’ but also the strategic management 
choice to both ‘make and buy’. Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot (2014a) draw from the 
private sector management literature on "concurrent sourcing," to build a theory for public 
sector mixed contracting. They argue that public managers face a broader range of 
contracting agents (both private for-profit and public inter-municipal) than private sector 
managers. In a study of 1474 US municipalities they found mixed delivery is more 
common with for-profit agents (38% of contracts) than among inter-municipal agents 
(13% of contracts). They argue that mixed delivery is a strategy to mitigate potential 
contracting risks, especially with for profit agents where goal congruence and principal 
agent problems are more pronounced. Mixed delivery is used to promote market 
complementarities, and ensure attention to citizen interests, while seeking to reduce costs. 
 
There are only a few studies that have analyzed the determinants of mixed delivery and 
typically these look at mixed delivery along with for-profit and intermunicipal 
contracting: Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke (2008); Warner and Hefetz (2008), Hefetz, 
Vigoda-Gadot and Warner (2014a). Mixed delivery is generally found to be a strategy in 
service markets that face low competition (Girth et al 2012). Mixed delivery also has been 
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shown to reduce contract reversals (Warner and Hefetz 2012) – a point that will be 
explored in more detail in the next section.  
 
Contract reversals 
Contracting may involve movement toward market or back toward public delivery in a 
dynamic process over time. In the 2007 special issue, Hefetz and Warner (2007) noted 
that contracting reversals were part of a broader strategy of market management to 
ensure social choice - a balance between market, public and citizen interests. Since that 
time, additional work in the US has found contract reversals to be part of a pragmatic 
managerial process (Hefetz and Warner, 2016; Warner and Hefetz, 2012). By contrast, 
in Europe and the global south, case study research has given new attention to this 
contract reversal process and a new name, “re-municipalization,” arguing that is is 
primarily political in motivation (McDonald 2016; Hall et al. 2013). By contrast, the 
European papers using quantitative analysis (Chong et al. 2015; Gradus et al., 2014; 
Perez-Lopez et al. 2015), find reversals to be a strategic element of pragmatic market 
management, often driven by problems with higher costs and lower quality of service 
under privatization. The most recent US data finds reversals more common in for-profit 
contracts than in intermunicipal contracts (Warner, 2016). While case study research 
suggests remunicipalization is an increasing trend, the US data show that contract 
reversals are not increasing – they are about the same level as new contracting out – 
suggesting a continuing market testing strategy as managers negotiate cross boundary 
interactions seeking complementarities as outlined by Hefetz (2016). 
 
Managing union and community interests  
While unionization is often considered to be an obstacle to local government reform, 
most studies use private sector or national level proxies and do not have local measures 
of public sector unionization. Those few studies that have direct measures of 
unionization find a more nuanced story. In a 2001 study of New York State, Warner and 
Hebdon (2001) found unions were only a negative factor when local governments 
implemented a single form of restructuring -- either privatization or inter-municipal 
cooperation. When more complex restructuring took place, for example, involving 
reverse privatization and entrepreneurship, the union factor was not significant. One 
possible explanation for this finding was that job losses in single restructuring cases 




Jalette and Hebdon (2012) opened the union ‘black box’ and examined the actual 
strategies that unions took in the face of threatened job losses among local governments 
in Canada. They found that unions employed a range of strategies from strikes, legal 
actions, negotiations and suggesting alternatives, to acquiescence. Surprisingly, 
negotiations and suggesting alternatives were both more common and more effective 
than strikes. Also, the existence of the acquiescence strategy (support or no reaction), 
not often documented in the literature, also supported the idea of union practicality.  
 
The most recent US studies have found unionization has no effect on for-profit 
contracting but has a suppression effect on intermunicipal cooperation (Kim and Warner 
2016) – possibly because of the difficulty of crafting cooperative agreements across 
different public sector unions. Most studies use labor opposition to alternative service 
delivery, rather than actual measures of unionization. These studies typically find no 
effect on for-profit contracting (Kim and Warner, 2016; Hefetz et al, 2014b), a positive 
effect on for profit contracting (Lobao and Adua 2012) and a negative effect on contract 
reversals (Hefetz and Warner 2016), as professional managers understand how to 
manage labor interests alongside the other interests local governments must balance – 
citizen, budget and community concerns (Kim and Warner, 2016). These results suggest 
the power of unionization may be inside the organization in forcing more professional 
management practices. Hefetz and Warner (2016) find unionized governments are more 
likely to monitor contracts, less likely to contract out in non-competitive markets, and 
more likely to pursue cooperative labor management relations. Kim and Warner (2016) 
call this “pragmatic municipalism.” 
 
Conclusion 
Market-based reforms rely on competition to achieve cost savings. But cost savings are 
hard to secure as most local government markets are noncompetitive and transactions 
costs are high. Local governments have been leading in exploring new alternatives that 
address these problems. Mixed delivery and contract reversals recognize the important 
market management role of local government in creating competition between the 
public and private sector and over time. Intermunicipal cooperation moves beyond 




While 20th century local government reforms focused primarily on the benefits of 
competition, 21st century reforms look more to the need for market management and the 
benefits of cooperation – across local governments, across public and private sectors 
and across labor, community and government interests. As fiscal pressures on local 
government mount, this pragmatic ability to engage in cross sector collaboration is the 
key reform for the future. 
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